The Modified Vickrey Double Auction
Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 101, Issue 2, December 2001, pages 572–584.
Publisher version / DOI Full text (PDF)
Abstract
We modify W. Vickrey's (1961, Journal of Finance 16, 8–37) mechanism for call markets by introducing the participation stage and study the efficiency properties of the modified mechanism. We provide sufficient conditions under which the modified Vickrey double auction achieves full efficiency. In addition, we prove that the modified Vickrey double auction achieves asymptotic efficiency even when full efficiency cannot be achieved.
JEL classification: C72, D44, D82.
Keywords: double auction; multilateral bargaining; efficiency; dominant strategy.
Suggested citation
Yoon, Kiho (2001), “The Modified Vickrey Double Auction,” Journal of Economic Theory 101(2), 572–584. https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2000.2736.
BibTeX
@article{Yoon2001ModifiedVickrey,
author = {Yoon, Kiho},
title = {The Modified Vickrey Double Auction},
journal = {Journal of Economic Theory},
year = {2001},
volume = {101},
number = {2},
pages = {572--584},
doi = {10.1006/jeth.2000.2736}
}